Abstract. Smart-cards have the tremendous advantage over their magnetic stripe ancestors of being able to execute cryptographic algorithms locally in their internal circuitry. This means that the user's secrets (be these PIN codes or keys) never have to leave the boundaries of the tamper-resistant silicon chip, which brings maximum security to the overall system in which the cards participate. Smart-cards also provide special-purpose microcontrollers with built-in, self-programmable memory. Together these features make the cost of a malevolent attack far greater than the benefits.
In 1996, 600 million IC cards will be manufactured throughout the world. This articles surveys the existing crypto-dedicated microprocessors and describes some of their possible evolutions.
-As cryptography progresses, semiconductor manufacturers are introducing new silicon geometries and cryptographic refinements at a very fast pace.
What Is a Smart Card?
The idea of inserting a chip into a plastic card is as old as public-key cryptography. The first patents are now 20 years old but practical public-key applications emerged only a few years ago, however, because of previous limitations in the storage and processing capacities of circuit technology. New silicon geometries and cryptographic processing refinements lead the industry to new generations of cards and more ambitious applications such as RSA [1] , the US Digital Signature Standard [2] , or the Russian Gost 34.10. Over the last four years, there has been increasing demand for public-key smart-cards from national administrations and large companies such as telephone operators, banks, and insurance corporations. More recently, the increasing popularity of home networking and Internet has opened another market.
The physical support of a conventional smart-card is a plastic rectangle printed with information-even advertising-concerning the application or the issuer, as well as readable information about the card holder (for instance, a validity date or a photograph). This support can also carry a magnetic stripe or a bar code label.
(Contactless smart cards are dedicated to hands-off applications such as public transportation or toll highways. They rely on radio transmission or highfrequency technologies and are not systematically embedded in a plastic support. Since these devices rarely include public-key accelerators, we excluded them from this survey.)
In accordance with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standard 7816, the micromodule contains an array of eight contacts, but only six are actually connected to the chip, which is usually not visible. The contacts are assigned to power supplies (V cc and V pp ), ground, clock, reset, and a serialdata communication link commonly called I/O. The ISO is currently considering various requests for respecification of the contacts: suppression of the two useless contacts, creation of a second I/O port, I2C bridging, and so on.
For the time being, card CPUs are 8-bit microcontrollers, the most common cores are Motorola's 68HC05 and Intel's 80C51. New 32-bit devices, however, will soon begin to appear. RAM capacities (typically ranging from 76 to 512 bytes) are very limited by the card's physical constraints. The card's microprocessor executes a program written in ROM at the mask-producing stage, which cannot be modified in any way. This guarantees that the the manufacturer strictly controls the code.
For storing user-specific data individual to each card, the first generation of non-volatile memories used EPROMs (electrically programmable memory). This required an extra "high voltage" power supply, typically from 15 to 25V. Recent components instead contain EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable memory), which requires a single 5V power supply (frequently that of the microprocessor) and can be written and erased thousands of times. It is sometimes possible to import executable programs into the card's EEPROM according to the needs of the card holder.
EEPROM size is a critical issue in the design of public-key applications, where keys are relatively large. Consequently, smart card programmers frequently adopt typical optimization techniques such as re-generating the publickeys from the secret-keys when needed, regenerating the secret-keys from shorter seeds (smaller secret numbers), avoiding large-key schemes (for instance FiatShamir [3] ), implementing compression algorithms for redundant data (text, user data, and so on), and EEPROM garbage collection mechanisms. Several manufacturers have developed real and complete operating systems for this purpose. (For further details, contact Integrity Arts, ppeyret@integrityarts.com.)
Finally, the card contains a communication port (serial via an asynchronous link) for exchanging data and control information between the card and the external world. A common bit rate is 9,600 bits per second, but much faster interfaces are commonly used (from 19,200 up to 115,200 bps) in full accordance with ISO 7816.
A first rule of security is to gather all these elements into a single chip, as illustrated in Figure 1 . If this is not done, the external wires linking one chip to another could represent a possible penetration route for illegal access (or use) of the card. ISO standards specify a card's ability to withstand a given set of mechanical stresses. Chip size is consequently limited, and present constraintsespecially memory and cryptographic capabilities-follow mainly from this limitation.
Smart-card chips are very reliable and most manufacturers guarantee the electrical properties of their chips for 10 years or more. Though ISO standards specify how a card must be protected against mechanical, electrical, or chemical aggressions, for most existing applications, a card is long obsolete before it is damaged. A well-known example is the French phone card, for which the failure rate is less than three per 10,000 pieces. Table 1 lists some of today's most common (not cryptography-dedicated) smart-card chips along with their characteristics.
Security detectors allow the microcontroller to prevent monitoring attempts by resetting the RAM/EEPROM. Clock detectors react to excessively high or slow clock frequencies. Too-high frequency influences timings-for instance, those needed for writing correctly in EEPROM-while a slow clock can indicate step-by-step execution attempts. Light and depasssivation sensors indicate that the micromodule was opened, and abnormal voltage can influence the random number generator and the EEPROM programming cicuitry.
For obvious security reasons, information about security detectors and tamper-resistance capabilities is usually rather hard to obtain from the manufacturers.
In general, smart-cards can help in situations that require secure portable objects, and in particular whenever the "external world" must work with data without knowing its actual value. The card's tamperproof quality, combined with public-key cryptography (secretless terminals), generally provides adequate solutions to many everyday security problems.
Communication and Command Format
Communication with smart-cards follows the guidelines of ISO Standard 7816-3. This standard currently defines only two protocols: byte-oriented T = 0 and block-oriented T = 1. However, the standard reserves up to 14 protocols. (T = 14 is very rare, and means that the communication protocol is proprietary.) Thus, electrical levels and error handshakes as well as the frequency used impose a specific hardware on the external side, which is the equivalent of a UART (universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter) with more sophisticated functions. This minimal hardware needed to operate a card consists of -a mechanical interface, the connector; -an electronic interface, the coupler; and -a box containing the first two elements, the smart-card reader.
The simplest readers are quite similar to modems and manage only the ISO communication protocol without interacting "intelligently" with card's operating system. These transparent readers should (but, in practice, may) operate with any smart card from any vendor complying with the ISO standard.
The most sophisticated readers accept programming with parts of the application logic and contain data (for instance RSA or DSA public keys), files, and programs. They can execute cryptographic functions; completely replace a PC; have keyboards, pin-pads, or displays; and generally use a specific programming language. These readers do not support all types of smart cards even if they comply with the ISO standard, because they often integrate particular commands dedicated to a given card.
To operate a card, the reader must implement the following four functions:
-power on/off the card, -reset the card -read data from the card (get commands), and -write data to the card (put commands).
Each get and put commands contain a header according to which the card processes the incoming data. (The header is actually a function code consisting of 5 bytes designated by CLA, INS, P1, P2 and LEN-class, instruction, parameter 1, parameter 2, and length.) The card sends an acknowledge byte and two status bytes (SW1 and SW2) during and after the execution of each command.
Arithmetic Co-processors
Modular multiplication (d = t mod n where t = ab) is probably the most frequently performed operation in modern cryptography. Efficient ways-measured in terms of speed and hardware complexity-for performing this operation are a major issue in most applications. However, in most cryptosystems, a and b change much more frequently than n, and therefore, most cryptographic accelerators are optimized for performing modular arithmetic over a rarely changing n.
An arithmetic co-processor (ACP) is a dedicated hardware for computing d, or in some cases, an entire modular exponentiation. Generally, the card's microcontroller deals with the ACP as a set of special RAM addresses where data is written (a, b, n) or read (d). ACPs usually operate in the following steps (possibly integrated as a macro command in a library provided by the silicon manufacturer):
1. hardware reset and initialization; 2. loading (or refreshing) the operands a, b and (optionally) n; 3. multiplication (possibly repeated); and 4. unloading the result.
The ACP performs step 1, which does not depend on the operand size N , in a constant number of clock cycles (constant time for a given clock frequency). Steps 2 and 4, which consist of manipulating data quantities of length generally equal or proportional to N , are linear in N . Classically, multiplications (step 3) requires a number of clock cycles that grows as the square of N . The resulting total time is therefore generally proportional to a second degree polynomial of N .
Since the algorithms for computing d are generally public, we encourage (really interested) readers to solicit a copy of our reference list (over 60 entries) for accurate details about these methods and their applications. Nevertheless, here is a brief presentation of the mathematics behind five of these schemes.
Montgomery. Chips by
N mod N . The algorithm is very simple (at initialization d ′ = 0):
de Waleffe and Quisquater. Philips' chips use this algorithm. These authors observe that the black-box f (y, x, c) = yx+c-where x is an N -bit integer, y is a v-bit register (typically v = 24) and c an N + v-bit accumulator-to -compute the product t (c is then the multiplication accumulator, x is a and y is the ith v-bit chunk of b) and -reduce the so-obtained t modulo n by adding to c = t an appropriate multiple y = k of x = −n = Two's complement of n.
It is easy to estimate k when n's v most significant bits (MSBs) are 1000000.... (Any n can be multiplied by an appropriate factor u such that un's v MSBs are 1000000.... See Knuth [5] for further details about these normalization techniques.)
The following loop, frequently called English multiplication by French speakers, computes d (when computation starts, d = 0):
Readers can find further details concerning the internal structure of f in the proceeding of Crypto 90. [6] Levy-dit-Vehel and Naccache. Gemplus' chip uses this algorithm, which computes t with a triplexed serial-parallel multiplier-that is, a hardware block that simultaneously multiplies ax, ay, and az, provided that x ∧ y = x ∧ z = y ∧ z = 0. A variant of Barrett's algorithm, described later, performs reduction. The algorithm executes the following steps:
Bucci and other variants of Barrett. Amtec's chip uses this algorithm. Barrett [7] approximates d by a quasi-reduced
The algorithm uses a parameter L, which limits in advance the maximal size of t (L = 2N is the optimal choice for exponentiation) and a pre-computed constant k = ⌊2 L /n⌋.
2. while d ≥ n, subtract n from d (this step is done at most twice); 3. return (d).
Here, x ≫ i denotes a shift of x to the right by i bits. In optimized designs, Barrett and Montgomery are roughly equivalent in gate count. For a given performance and 512-bit arguments, however, our benchmarks reveal a slightly larger second-degree coefficient for Barrett.
Sedlak. Siemens uses this reduction algorithm, in which comparisons of t with 1/3, 1/6, ... of n play a very important role. Assume that during the division of t by n, n was already shifted and subtracted several times from t, and let the remainder be stored in t. Sedlak's algorithm ensures that |t| ≤ n/3. This will be also true for the following steps as will be shown now. By assumption, t falls into one of the following ranges:
Range 2 n/6 < |t| < n/3 Range 3 n/12 < |t| < n/6 . . . . . .
for some i > 1. Now n is shifted i bits to the right, and for result n ′ = n/2 i we have
For the result, t ′ = t±n ′ ≤ n ′ /3 holds again. Since we hereby proved that this condition is always met, n shifts in every step by at least i = 2 bits. However, the expected value of i is 3, which improves the reduction complexity by an average factor of 1/3 when compared to the basic bit-by-bit reduction.
Technology
We have compiled a catalog of characteristics of the existing and upcoming technologies. See the Technology box (next page) for details.
We solicited several manufacturers concerning the commercial, technical, and algorithmic aspects of the ACPs. The following manufacturers responded to our questionnaire:
Queen's University and NTT did not answer, but we collected some information from conference proceedings, patents, and publications. Oki and Toshiba did not reply either, but some data was available in Gemplus' Competition Analysis Department. Finally, Hitachi and Sandia did not reply, and nearly nothing is known about their chips. Actually, we know one bit of information: They exists.
Readers can contact the chip manufacturers listed in Table A directly for more precise details about a given ACP. Table B and C provide synthetic data (technical, commercial, and benchmark) about these different ACPs. 
High-level Implementation
It is generally recommended to separate the cryptographic schemes (RSA, DSA, Rabin, GOST, and so on) from the cryptographic operations (sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt, hash, and key exchange). Designers can achieve this by implementing in the card an I/O buffer into which the terminal writes data to be processed. In this model, the following steps are executed whenever the card performs a cryptographic operation:
1. A put command selects a key file specific to a scheme. 2. A put command writes data to process (message, ciphertext, signature, and so on) to the I/O RAM buffer. 3. A get command (specific to an operation) retrieves the card's result.
Such an approach results in a simplified command set and allows to upgrade the card without adding new command codes. The following toy example illustrates -the encryption of the message "process me that" with the RSA keys contained in file 2401; -the signature of the message "123" by the DSA file 334A; and -a Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the keys contained in file E1F3.
select file 2401
ISO exchange: card to reader {RSA, 768, s/e/i} /* ∼ = TYPE in DOS */ File selection returns the key file type (here 768-bit RSA) and the cryptographic operations allowed with this file (s = signature and verification e = encryption and decryption, i = identification and verification, k = key exchange).
put data ISO exchange: reader to card {"process me that" /* data to process */ get data: encrypt 0000 ISO exchange: card to reader {"E32A371B908AB37"} /* ∼ = ENCRYPT.EXE */
The 0000 sent to the card (P1=P2=00) means that the result (here the ciphertext E32...) should be sent to the terminal. A nonzero code would indicate a file ID where the ciphertext should be written.
select file 334A
ISO exchange: card to reader {DSA, 512, s} /* ∼ = TYPE in DOS */ put data ISO exchange: reader to card {"123"} /* data to process */ get data: sign 0000 ISO exchange: card to reader {"ADE603B826FDE04"} /* ∼ = SIGN.EXE */ select file E1F3 ISO exchange: card to reader {D-H, 512, k } /* ∼ = TYPE in DOS */ put data ISO exchange: reader to card {"process me that"} /* aˆx mod p */ get data: key-exchange 2010 ISO exchange: card to reader {"AE589EB6A564CDD"} /* ∼ = KEY EXCH.EXE returns aˆy mod p */ During a key exchange, the user must specify a destination file ID (here 2010) for the common key. The outside world can never access this value). A user typically uses this file for keying triple-DES operations.
We encourage readers to contact the card manufacturers directly for further details concerning a given mask. See the Technology box for contact information. Unlike ACP designs, masks are constantly changed and improved. For instance, Siemens offers elliptic-curve functions, Gemplus offers several EEP-ROM options (El-Gamal [8] , Schnorr [9] , Rabin, GOST 34.10, and so on). Other publications [10] , [11] or Web sites frequently provide valuable information about product evolution and specific "cookbook" optimizations. 
Performance
Philips, Siemens, Thomson, and Motorola will certainly dominate the smartcard cryptoprocessor market for the next three years. The existing applications and prototypes seem to confirm this. We therefore focus the remaining sections of our survey on chips from these four companies. Table 2 lists characteristics of some recent applications of smart-cards coprocessors. Table 3 compares the speeds of various smart-card chips, listing their processing times for signature, verification, and key generation. Our benchmarks indicate that the speed difference between the ST16CF54A and the SLE44C200 is relatively important. Although slower than the these, Philips' old design (P83C852) seems the most elegant, both in terms of silicon area, and algorithm and circuit simplicity.
As Table 4 shows, the most flexible designs in terms of operand size are generally slower. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show curves that underline differences in performance and area. Figure 4 (considered along with Figures 2 and 3) shows that performance is closely related to te ACPs area (assuming the same technology). SCALPS deserves its name very well (Smart-CArd for Low PAyment Systems): its size is about half that of microcontroller-based ones.
Conclusion
Before choosing a crypto-processor, contact as many manufacturers as possible and ask questions. Are RSA/PKP patent licenses included in the deal? Will you have access to library source codes? Can you modify these? Which agencies will receive technical details about the chip and/or your application? Compare the answers, and consider unanswered questions and unauditable codes as gray areas and potential problem sources.
Most manufacturers sell three or four generic products that together cover a big percentage of the market needs. Consider the possibility of purchasing and [5] for theory and implementation aspects) C Signature time with CRT V Verification time K (On-board) key generation time customizing such a general-purpose mask. If your application is more specific, decide exactly what is most important. Some considerations are time performance, price, development ease, physical security, tools (libraries, emulators), modularity, portability (very easy when microprocessor cores are identical but relatively complicated if not), EEPROM space for dedicated applications, availability of a true random number generator, and so on.
